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THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY
APPEALS AND MILITARY DUE PROCESS
HON. ROB RT EMMMV QUINN t
T EN years ago Congress created the United States Court
of Military Appeals. That action has been described
as the "most revolutionary" ever taken by Congress in
carrying out its constitutional responsibility "to make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces." ' Establishment of the Court was revolutionary be-
cause, for the first time in American military law, it
provided for direct review of courts-martial by a judicial
tribunal composed entirely of civilian judges. Civilian re-
view was regarded as "the 'most vital element' in the [new]
reformation and unification of military criminal law .... ,, 2
Only the more serious cases, that is, cases in which a dis-
honorable or bad conduct discharge was imposed or in
which the accused was confined for one year or more, were
made subject to review by the Court of Military Appeals.
It was contemplated, however, that the Court would function
as the "Supreme Court" of the whole military justice
system, which includes the summary court-martial which
has no power to impose a sentence of the kind subject
to review by the Court of Military Appeals, and that the
decisions of the Court would be applied in all courts-
martial.3
t Chief judge of the Military Court of Appeals.
1H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).2 Walker & Niebank, The Court of Military Appeals-Its History, Organ-
ication and Operation, 6 VAND. L. REv. 228 (1953).
3 There are three courts-martial in the military system, the summary, the
special, and the general court-martial. The first is composed of a single officer,
and the trial is conducted on a very informal basis. The second is composed
of at least three officers and enlisted personnel, if enlisted personnel are
specially requested by the accused. The general court-martial is composed
of at least five members. The "judge" in the special court-martial is the
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In the decade that has passed since its creation, the
Court of Military Appeals has been subject to searching
critiques of its operations and decisions. The latter have
been examined in depth by practicing lawyers, military
and civilian alike, by professors and students of the law,
and by others interested in military matters. As a new
institution in the federal governmental structure, the Court
itself has been both praised and damned. It has been the
subject of a commendatory thesis for a doctoral degree in
Government, 4 and it has been excoriated by others because
they believe the Court has usurped the prerogatives of the
President of the United States.5 As Chief Judge, I welcome
the careful and continued attention given to the Court by
the general public and the bar. Not long after the Court
published its first decision, I expressed the hope that the
bar in particular would "follow closely" the work of the
Court, and "tell the public, the services and us ... whether
we [were] performing properly our task of enunciating
principles worthy of existence. . . ,, 6 The array of spirited
President of the court-martial, but his rulings on interlocutory questions are
subject to objection by the other members. See United States v. Bridges,
12 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 30 C.M.R. 96 (1961). The judge in the general court-
martial is the law officer; his rulings on interlocutory matters, except on a
question of insanity or a motion for a finding of not guilty, are not subject
to objection by a court member. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 51(b),
10 U.S.C. § 851(b) (1958) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ]. The course of
review of a conviction varies according to the court and the sentence adjudged.
All cases are reviewed initially by the convening authority. UCMJ art. 64,
10 U.S.C. 5 864 (1958). Thereafter, review of summary and special court
convictions in which the sentence does not include a bad conduct discharge
is in the Office of The Judge Advocate General of the accused's armed force.
Special and general court convictions resulting in a punitive discharge, or
confinement at hard labor for one year or more, or cases affecting a general
or flag officer are reviewed by. a board of review appointed by The Judge
Advocate General of the accused's service. Cases reviewed by the board of
review are either appealable to the Court of Military Appeals or subject to
mandatory review. UCMJ arts. 65-67, 10 U.S.C. §§ 865-67 (1958).
4 Feld, The United States Court of Military Appeals: A Study of the
Origin and Early Development of the First Civilian Tribunal for Direct
Review of Courts-Martial (1951-1959), Georgetown Univ. Lib. (1960).
5 Fratcher, Presidential Pozver to Regudate Military Justice: A Critical
Study of Decisions of the Coart of Military Appeals, 34 N. Y. U. L. REV.
861 (1959) ; Jarrell, The Vanishing American Naval Officer, 80 U.S. NAVAL
INST. PROC. 969 (Sept. 1954); Rydstrom, Self-Incrimination Refined, 19
JUDGE ADVOCATE, JR. 1 (Feb. 1955).
6 Quinn, The Court's Responsibility, 6 VAND. L. REv. 161, 162 (1953).
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articles and commentary on the Court and its work is happy
realization of that hope.
The current compliments and criticisms of the Court
of Military Appeals parallel those attending its creation.
The Court was established in the crucible of controversy.
The controversy has ebbed and flowed through the first
years of its existence. One student of the conflict has
concluded that the Nation's experience with the Court has
established civilian review of courts-martial as a fixed prin-
ciple of military law.7  Even one of the most outspoken
critics of the Court has said that the "country is simply
not going back to any system of military justice which
lacks that safeguard." 8 1 share that view entirely apart
from my position as Chief Judge of the Court. It is
appropriate, therefore, to review some of the decisions of
the Court in its formative years-years, incidentally, which
encompassed full-scale war conditions in Korea; the emer-
gency situation in Lebanon, with its accompanying combat
alert for a considerable part of our military forces; and
the stationing of our land, naval and air units all over
the world. These decisions are the foundation of the ad-
ministration of military justice in the years ahead, whether
those years be years of peace; years on the brink of war;
or years of war itself.
DEVELOPMENT OF M=ILITARY DUE PRocm
Fundamental to the American system of law is the
idea of due process. The idea itself defies easy definition
and, more often than not, is recited in terms of specific
prohibitions on the sovereign or as rights of the individual.
In any event, it is the responsibility of the courts to give
effect to the doctrine. As the highest court in the military
judicial system, the Court of Military Appeals is intrinsically
responsible for the military's observance of, and compliance
with, the limitations and the rights embraced in the principle
7 Feld, op. cit. supra note 4, at 222.
8 Wiener, Soldiers Versus Lawyers, 9 ARMY 58, 62 (1958).
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of due process. The responsibility is emphasized by the fact
that, on completion of appellate review, a court-martial
conviction is "binding" upon all "departments, courts ...
and officers of the United States... ." 9
Judged by its first opinion on the subject, the Court's
approach to due process appeared to be a narrow one. In
United States v. Clay,'0 the prosecution was for two minor
offenses. The accused, a hospitalman in the Navy, was
charged with breach of the peace for fighting with some
Koreans in Pusan, Korea, and with improperly wearing the
uniform. Brought to trial before a special court-martial,
he entered a plea of not guilty to the first charge and
a plea of guilty to the other. Article 51 (c) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice requires that before the court-
martial deliberates on the findings it must be instructed
on the elements of the offenses charged, the presumption of
innocence, and on the burden of the government to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. No such instructions were
given. The accused was convicted, and the conviction was
in due course affirmed by a board of review in the Navy.
The Court of Military Appeals reversed the conviction be-
cause the accused was denied "necessary elements of military
due process." 11 Just what the Court meant by prefacing
"due process" with the word "military" became a matter
of considerable debate. The point in issue was whether
"military due process" was limited to the provisions of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and was something
apart from the constitutional due process which prevailed
in the federal civilian courts.
Those who argued that military due process was some-
thing apart from the regular federal due process relied
9 UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C. S 876 (1958). It should be noted that a court-
martial conviction, like a conviction in a civil court, is subject to collateral
attack on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in the broad sense, which includes
deprivation of a fundamental right. Note, Military Law--Due Process-
Review of Courts-Martial on Petition for Habeas Corpus, 21 GEo. WASH. L.
R v. 492 (1953). There are also other means of collateral attack such as suit
in the Court of Claims to recover a fine or forfeiture. See Johnson v.
United States, 280 F.2d 856 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
20United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
II Id. at 82, 1 C.M.R. at 82.
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upon certain language in the Clay opinion. The opinion
said that the Court did not "bottom" the due process re-
quirements for military courts on the United States Con-
stitution but "base[d] them on the rights granted by
Congress to military personnel." This language was inter-
preted as a ruling that the Uniform Code of Military Justice
was the sole source of due process rights in the military
justice system. Whether the advocates of this restricted
concept of statutory due process read too much into the Clay
opinion need not detain us. A significant supplement to the
Clay case was the opinion in United States v. Lee 12 which
the Court handed down some three months later.
In the Lee case the question before the Court was
whether the trial counsel, who acts as the prosecuting at-
torney, was disqualified because he made an informal in-
vestigation of the facts before the filing of charges and
had signed the formal charge sheet against the accused.
Article 27 (a) of the Uniform Code prohibits a person who
has acted as the investigating officer in a formal investiga-
tion of charge from thereafter acting as trial counsel. Pro-
ceeding on the assumption that trial counsel should have
been disqualified because of his previous connection with
the case, the Court went on to consider what errors of
procedure would justify reversal of a conviction where
there is a statutory provision, as there is in the Uniform
Code, that a conviction shall not be reversed for error
of law "unless the error materially prejudices the substantial
rights of the accused." 1' It noted with approval the gen-
eral rule that errors of substance fall into two categories,
the first being "a recognizable departure from a constitu-
tional precept, and, [the] second, where it constitutes a
departure from an express command of the legislature." 14
This was implicit acknowledgment that constitutional pre-
cepts were constituent elements of due process in courts-
martial. The remainder of the opinion which deals with
121 U.S.C.M.A. 212, 2 C.M.R. 118 (1952).
23 UCMJ art. 59(a), 10 U.S.C. S 859(a) (1958).14United States v. Lee, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 212, 216, 2 C.M.R. 118, 122 (1952).
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what came to be called the doctrine of general prejudice
added force to the acknowledgment.
Judge Brosman, who wrote the opinion of the Court,
conceived the phrase "general prejudice" to describe certain
rights of an accused which were neither constitutional nor
statutory. He had an unusual command of language and
a flair for the dramatic, but it was not these qualities which
led him to propose the new terminology. He spoke of
general prejudice as existing when there was an "overt
departure from some 'creative and indwelling principle'-
some critical and basic norm operative in the area under
consideration," without regard to whether the departure
also constituted "a violation of constitutional or legislative
provisions." 15 The opinion indicates a conviction that due
process in courts-martial does not rest exclusively on statute.
That was the real lesson of the Lee case. At the time, its
meaning was not fully understood. Part of the reason
perhaps was the close parallel between the rights accorded
an accused in the military by the Uniform Code and those
granted to defendants in a civil criminal prosecution by
constitutional due process. 16 Usually, therefore, it was un-
necessary to look beyond the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and the supplementary provisions of the Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, which were pro-
mulgated by the President in accordance with the authority
granted by Congress to prescribe the "procedure, including
modes of proof in cases before courts-maxtial" 17 for the
delineation of military due process rights. About a year
after the Lee case, however, the Court was faced with an
ostensible conflict between a provision of the Uniform Code
and a principle of civilian due process. The case was
United States v. Sutton.'8
Marine Corps Private Alton D. Sutton was charged
with shooting himself in the hand in order to avoid military
15 Id. at 217, 2 C.M.R. at 123.
16 United States v. Clay, szpra note 10, at 77-78, 1 C.M.R. at 77-78.
17 UCMJ art. 36(a), 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (1958).
18 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 11 C.M.R. 220 (1953).
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service, and with two other offenses. At his trial by general
court-martial in the United States, the prosecution intro-
duced in evidence the answers to written interrogatories
obtained from a Government witness stationed in Korea.
Neither the accused nor his counsel was present at, the
taking of the deposition, although defense counsel had been
given the opportunity to submit written cross-interrogatories.
The deposition procedure was allegedly sanctioned by Article
49 of the Uniform Code. In pertinent part, that article
provides that any party may take an oral or written deposi-
tion upon giving reasonable notice of the time and place
for the taking to the other party. Elaborating on this
provision, the Manual for Courts-Martial directs that, in
the case of a deposition on written interrogatories, -the party
desiring the deposition shall submit to the opposing party
a list of the questions to be propounded and allow him
a reasonable time to submit cross-interrogatories and ob-
jections. 19 A majority of the Court held that, while the
accused was not accorded the right to confront the witness
against him, the procedure did not violate military due
process. While a majority agreed on the result, each judge
advanced a basically different reason for agreement.
The principal opinion held that the "source and strength"
of the military due process was the Uniform Code, and
that the Code could limit constitutional due process. I
dissented strongly from that view; and I warmly approved
the statement by Chief Justice Vinson in Burns v. Wilson
that "military courts, like the state courts, have the same
responsibilities as do the federal courts to protect a person
from a violation of his constitutional rights." 20 Judge
Brosman, who joined in the principal opinion, upheld the
deposition procedure on the ground that it was a "necessary"
exception to the constitutional right of confrontation.
The Sutton case sustained a procedure which had no
counterpart in the federal courts, but the separateness of
the grounds upon which concurrence in the result was
19 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 117b.
20346 U.S. 137, 142, rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
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obtained did not wipe out the significance of the Lee case.
The Constitution was still the primary point of reference
for military due process. Forthright reaffirmation of that
dogma was set out in the separate opinions in United States
v. Ivory.2 And, more than such reaffirmation, a later re-
examination of the deposition procedure resulted in un-
equivocal rejection of the Sutton decision. 2
It can be said, therefore, that military due process be-
gins with the basic rights and privileges defined in the
federal constitution. It does not stop there. The letter
and the background of the Uniform Code add their weighty
demands to the requirements of a fair trial. Military due
process is, thus, not synonymous with federal civilian due
process. It is basically that, but something more, and
something different. How much more and how much dif-
ferent is indefinable in general terms for all possible situ-
ations. A discussion of the Court of Military Appeals'
approach to specific rights and procedures in courts-martial
will serve to illumine the nature and the scope of due process
in the military judicial system.
United States v. Clay listed twelve basic rights, ranging
from the right to be informed of the charges to the right
to appellate review of the legality of the findings of guilty
and the sentence. The Court expressly noted that the
listing was not "intended . . . [to be] all-inclusive." 23 In
the decade since the Clay case other rights, such as the
right to have the court-martial free from the influence of
command order, policy, or psychological pressure,24 have
been added to the list, and rights previously listed have
been given wider application to effectuate the spirit and
the letter of provisions of the Uniform Code.25  Detailed
21 9 U.S.C.M.A. 516, 26 C.M.R. 296 (1958).
22United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
23 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 78, 1 C.M.R. 74, 78 (1951).
24 See United States v. Shepherd, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 90, 25 C.M.R. 352 (1958);
United States v. Rinehart, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 24 C.M.R. 212 (1957).
25 One of the rights enumerated in the Clay case is the right to exclusion
of an involuntary confession from consideration by the court-martial. The
fifth amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. The right is enlarged by Article 31
[ VOL. 35
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consideration of even the original enumeration of basic
rights is much beyond the scope of this article. Two rights
of wide application have been selected for review.
THE R-IGHT TO COUNSEL
A passage from the opinion of the United States Supreme
Court in Powell v. Alabama,2 6 is frequently quoted in cases
concerning -the constitutional right to have assistance of
counsel in defending against a criminal charge. It is that
an accused "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step of the proceedings against him." 27 There are three
main steps in a criminal prosecution, namely, the pretrial
proceeding; the trial itself; and appellate review. That the
accused is entitled to legal assistance during the trial is
well-settled and well-known. Less clear, and certainly less
known, is the operation of the right in the pretrial and
of the Code. Besides reiterating the constitutional provision, it provides as
follows: "No person subject to this code may interrogate, or request any
statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first
informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does
not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused
or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence
against him in a trial by court-martial." UCMJ art. 31(b), 10 U.S.C. § 831(b)
(1958).
No similar requirements exist in the federal courts, although as a matter
of practice, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation advise a suspect that
he need not say anything, but if he does speak, anything he says may be used
against him in a trial by court-martial." UCMJ art. 31 (b), 10 U.S.C. § 831 (b)
Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REv. 24, 64-65 (1960).
But cf. United States v. Holder, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 448, 28 C.M.R. 14 (1959).
The purpose and policy of Article 31 have led the Court to reverse a con-
viction where evidence has been admitted in violation of the requirement of
advice, without regard to whether the other competent evidence of guilt is
compelling. United States v. Williams, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 443, 24 C.M.R. 253
(1959). At the same time, it should be noted that despite the broad language
of the article, which applies to all persons subject to the Code, the Court
has held that the interrogation leading to a statement by the accused must be
of an official nature, and of a kind which is concerned with the search for
evidence of crime. If the accused makes an incriminating statement in
response to a question put to him by a person acting in a private capacity,
as distinguished from an official capacity, or in an investigation other than
that looking to obtain evidence of crime, the statement is admissible without
the preliminary requirement of advice. See United States v. Souder, 11
U.S.C.M.A. 59, 28 C.M.R. 283 (1959).
26287 U.S. 45 (1932).2 Id. at 69.
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post-trial proceedings. In fact, the right to counsel's assist-
ance during a preliminary investigation by law enforcement
agents in the pretrial proceeding has only recently come
before the United States Supreme Court.28  The right to
counsel in this critical period is, however, clearly marked
out in military law by both the Uniform Code and the
decisions of the Court of Military Appeals.
The right to counsel was expressly incorporated by
Congress into the Uniform Code regarding offenses to be
tried by general court-martial, the highest trial court in
the military justice system.29  Article 32 provides that no
charge may be referred to a general court-martial for trial
until "a thorough and impartial investigation" of the charge
has been made. A loose analogy between this pretrial in-
vestigation and the customary preliminary hearing in the
civilian criminal law may be drawn. There are also im-
portant differences. As in the civilian community, a de-
termination in the preliminary hearing that the available
evidence against the accused is insufficient to support a
conviction does not bar further proceedings. Just as the
grand jury may return an indictment, despite the de-
fendant's discharge at the hearing, 30 the recommendation of
the investigating officer that the charge be dropped, is not
binding upon the court-martial authority who ordered the
investigation; the decision to refer a charge to trial to a
particular court-martial or to dismiss it, is his alone.3 1
In the civilian community the accused has, at best, only
a limited right to discover before trial the evidence available
against him; 32 in military practice he is given a copy
of the entire pretrial investigation, including the statements
of witnesses and other evidence considered by the investigat-
ing officer.3 3 The pretrial investigation is, therefore, an
28In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
29 See note 3 supra.
30 See United States v. Gray, 87 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1949).
31UCMJ art. 34(b), 10 U.S.C. §834(b) (1958). United States v.
Greenwalt, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 569, 20 C.M.R. 285 (1955).
32 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959)
United States v. Dierker, 164 F. Supp. 304 (W.D. Pa. 1958).33UCMJ art. 32(b), 10 U.S.C. 9832(b) (1958). See United States v.
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important means of discovery, since the accused is accorded
the right to have the investigating officer call all "available
witnesses" and to cross-examine those witnesses. If a
verbatim record of the testimony is made, the transcript
is admissible in evidence at the trial should a witness die
or be unable to attend the trial because of illness or dis-
tance.34 It is apparent, therefore, that the pretrial investiga-
tion in the military is no mere formality, but a substantial
right of, and protection to, the accused. It is so "integral"
a part of the court-martial proceedings, that a material de-
parture from its requirements will, upon the accused's timely'
objection, entitle him to reversal of his conviction. 35
Given the purposes and the consequences of the pre-
trial investigation, it is not surprising to find that the ac-
cused is accorded the right to be represented by counsel
at the investigation. He has three choices. First, he may
select his own counsel from the civilian community. The
person chosen must be a member of the bar, whether that
bar is the bar of the highest court of any state of the
United States, the bar of a federal court, or the bar of a
foreign country.36 If the accused exercises that choice, he
Samuels, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 206, 27 C.M.R 280 (1959) ; United States v. Nichols,
8 U.S.C.M.A. 119, 23 C.M.R. 343 (1957).
34United States v. Eggers, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 191, 11 C.M.R. 191 (1953).
Normally no counsel is appointed to represent the Government in the Article
32 investigation. As a result, it has been argued that a transcript of a wit-
ness's testimony would be inadmissible against the Government. To overcome
the defect, it has been suggested that the accused move for appointment of
counsel to represent the Government if he "anticipates use at the trial of the
transcript" of the testimony. FF:w, A MANUAL OF COURTS-MARTIAL PRACTICE
AND APPEAL, § 23, p. 40.
35 United States v. Nichols, supra note 33; see also United States v. Mickel.
9 U.S.C.M.A. 324, 26 C.M.R. 104 (1958).
36 See United States v. Sears, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 661, 20 C.M.R. 377 (1956).
The fact that civilian counsel may be a member of the bar of a foreign
country can be a matter of considerable importance to an accused. The
Uniform Code operates worldwide; that is, it attaches to our Armed Forces
wherever they are stationed, whether in outlying possessions of the United
States or in foreign countries and territories. UCMJ art. 5, 10 U.S.C. § 805
(1958). See Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army; An-
other Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REv. 435 (1960),
which questions the right of Congress to make certain civilian type offenses
triable by court-martial in time of peace. Consequently, the accused's freedom
to choose counsel from among the bar of a foreign country in which he is
stationed is a valuable right. At the same time, this liberality of choice poses
19611
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must pay the fees of his counsel. Second, the accused may
select military counsel of his choice. The option here is
subject to counsel's reasonable availability.37  Third, if
the accused does not desire either civilian or military counsel
of his own choice, he has the right to have counsel appointed
for him. Whether selected or appointed, defense counsel
in a general court-martial must be professionally qualified. 38
Pretrial investigation is of course not limited to the
formal preliminary hearings under Article 32 of the Uniform
Code. As in the civilian community, informal investigation
by law enforcement agents is the initial, and perhaps, most
important means of obtaining evidence against the accused.
Military police investigations are generally circumscribed
by the same constitutional and statutory safeguards that
protect an accused in the civilian community. For example,
evidence obtained by unlawful search or by wiretapping is
inadmissible in a court-martial on the same bases that forbid
introduction of such evidence in a prosecution in a federal
district court.3 9 As for the right to counsel, military law,
like the regular federal law, does not give a suspect the
right to have counsel appointed to assist him during in-
terrogation by the police. He cannot, however, be "pre-
cluded from obtaining necessary legal advice," and to have
his own lawyer "present with him during [his] interro-
a problem in a prosecution involving the disclosure of classified material.
Ordinarily, the accused cannot be deprived of his right to counsel of his own
choice on the ground that the lawyer he chooses does not have a security
clearance. United States v. Nichols, supra note 33. Whether this rule
applies where the accused selects counsel from a country "behind the Iron
Curtain" has never come before the Court of Military Appeals, and it may be
considered an open question.
37 UCMJ art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1958); United States v. Vanderpool,
4 U.S.C.M.A. 561, 16 C.M.R. 135 (1954).
8UCMJ art. 27(b), 10 U.S.C. §827(b) (1958); United States v.
Kraskouskas, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 607, 26 C.M.R. 387 (1958).
39 It is appropriate to point out that the analogy is not wholly applicable
so far as judicial "policy" safeguards are concerned. Thus, the rule of
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) which prohibits admission into
evidence of a confession obtained from- the defendant during an unreasonable
delay between arrest and preliminary hearing has not been carried over into
court-martial practice. United States v. Moore, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 16 C.M.R.
56 (1954); United States v. Dicario, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 353, 24 C.M.R. 163
(1957).
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gation.. . .40 Denial of these rights will make a con-
fession obtained from the accused in the course of the
interrogation inadmissible in evidence at the trial.41
Turning to the right to counsel on appeal from a con-
viction, Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure indicates that a convicted accused can obtain ap-
pointed counsel only if he lacks the pecuniary ability to
pay for an attorney of his own choice.42  No such lhmita-
tion exists in the military. Congress, through the Uniform
Code has accorded full sweep to the right of assistance of
counsel, and has given the accused the same right to ap-
pointed military counsel for the purpose of appeal as he has
for the formal pretrial proceedings, and for the trial itself,
without consideration of his ability to pay for a civilian
lawyer.43  The right to appointed counsel extends to all
levels of appellate review.4 4  The right to the assistance
of counsel, means more than having a lawyer stand or
sit beside the accused. It means that counsel must truly
assist; he must actually represent the accused. If the rep-
resentation of counsel is so lacking in diligence or com-
petence as to reduce the proceedings to a sham, the accused
40 United States v. Gunnels, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 133, 135, 23 C.M.R. 354,
357, 359 (1957).
41 United States v. Gunnels, supra note 40. Cf. Escute v. Delgado, 282 F.2d
335 (1st Cir. 1960). A number of states have statutes granting an accused
the right to communicate and consult with counsel whenever he is placed in
restraint or under interrogation by the police. A violation of such a statute
is generally not regarded as making inadmissible an incriminating statement
made during the interrogation. H. B. & E. A. Rothblatt, Police Interrogation:
The Right to Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV.
24, 61 n.174 (1960).
42 See United States v. Arlen, 252 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958). Cf. Lee v.
United States, 235 F.2d 219 (D. C. Cir. 1956) which appears to hold that a
defendant is entitled to appointed counsel if he either cannot or does not select
his own.
43UCMJ arts. 38(c), 70, 10 U.S.C. §5 838(c), 870 (1958).
44 Depending upon the court and the court-martial power of the convening
authority, there are either three or four such levels of review. See note 3
.upra. For the nature of, and the limitations on, appellate review see UCMJ
arts. 66-67, 10 U.S.C. 5§ 866-67 (1958). FEim, MANUAL OF COURTS-MARTIAL
PaAcIcE, SS 87, 97, 102, 118.
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is entitled to reversal of his conviction.4 5 The rule also
applies to representation at the appellate level.46
Special provisions in military practice give rise to
certain qualifications of the general rule. Unlike the usual
situation in civilian courts, an accused in the military can
be brought to trial on offenses which are entirely dis-
similar in nature and which were committed at different
times. The military rule is that all known offenses should
be joined in a single charge sheet and referred to trial
at the same time. Also the court members, who in the
main act like the jury in the civilian court, not only de-
termine the accused's guilt or innocence, but also impose
the sentence. As a result, it is possible for inadequacy of
representation to extend only to one of several charges,
or only to the sentence but not the findings of guilty.
To understand this limited effect of inadequate representa-
tion, it must first be understood that ineffectiveness of
counsel does not deprive the court-martial of the power to
proceed to verdict and sentence.4 7 In other words, lack
of effective assistance of counsel is not jurisdictional in
the sense that the proceedings are wholly void.48 Rather,
45 There is no definite standard by which to judge the incompetency or
inadequacy of counsel. Each case depends upon its own facts. A few il-
lustrations will suffice to show the variety of possible situations. A lawyer
who concedes guilt in final argument, although the accused entered a plea of
not guilty and testified on the merits offering a valid defense, deprives the
accused of effective assistance of counsel and reversal of the accused's con-
viction is required. United States v. Walker, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 355, 12 C.M.t.
111 (1953). Similarly, a lawyer who sits silently throughout the trial, offering
nothing and saying nothing on behalf of the accused, although the record
shows the ready availability of substantial evidence favorable to the accused,
does not provide the degree of competent assistance to which an accused is
entitled. United States v. McFarlane, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 23 C.M.R. 320 (1957).
Counsel may not represent an accused when such representation conflicts with
his obligation to another client who is a government witness. United States
v. Thornton, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 57, 23 C.M.R. 281 (1957). See also Avins, The
Duty of Military Defense Counsel to an Accused, 58 MICH. L. REv. 347
(1960).
46 See United States v. Fisher, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 396, 24 C.M.R. 206 (1957).
47 United States v. Gardner, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 25 C.M.R. 310 (1958).
48 It should be noted that there is a difference in "jurisdiction," from the
standpoint of power to proceed to verdict, and "jurisdiction" from the stand-
point of collateral attack upon the validity of a conviction by means of habeas
corpus. In the latter situation jurisdiction is given an expanded meaning.
See United States v. Vanderpool, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 561, 10 C.M.R. 135 (1954).
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they may be considered voidable to the extent they are
affected by counsel's inadequacy. Two cases decided by
the Court of Military Appeals provide good illustrations
of the way the limitation operates.
In United States v. Gardner 49 the accused was charged
with three specifications of larceny, and with one specifica-
tion of failing to obey an order. He pleaded guilty to two
of the larcenies, but not guilty to the third larceny and
to the charge of violating an order. The meaning and
effect of the plea of guilty were fully explained to him
and he was advised he did not have to plead guilty. Still,
he persisted in the plea of guilty to the two larcenies.
The trial proceeded as to the offenses to which the accused
pleaded not guilty. The court-martial found the accused
guilty of the third larceny, but acquitted him of the
order offense. On review of the case, the Court of Military
Appeals held that it was unmistakably clear from the record
that defense counsel's knowledge of trial practice "was so
deficient as to result in inadequate representation." How-
ever, it went on to point out that the offenses to which the
accused had pleaded guilty were completely unrelated to
the contested issues. It further noted there was no claim
that the accused had entered the plea of guilty on the
mistaken advice of counsel, or that he had any defense to
the charges to which he pleaded guilty. It concluded
that, in these circumstances, reversal of the findings of
guilty based on the free and voluntary plea of guilty was
not justified. Accordingly, it set aside only the findings
of guilty as to which the accused had pleaded not guilty
and it directed a rehearing on these charges and the
sentence. 0
499 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 25 C.M.R. 310 (1958).
50 To the uninitiated in military practice, the disposition directed by the
Court probably needs some explanation. In civilian practice, error as to one or
several counts of a multiple count indictment ordinarily presents no special
problem. The appellate court either ignores the error and sustains the sentence
because it is supported by the "good" counts; or it merely dismisses the
"bad" count, and returns the case to the lower court for resentencing of the
accused on the remaining counts. Also sentence is imposed on each count
which may be made to run consecutively or concurrently. Under military law,
1961 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The second case is United States v. Winchester.1 There
the accused was brought to trial with a co-accused. He
entered a plea of guilty to four charges including one of
larceny of government rifles for the purpose of sale in
Mexico. He was represented by individual military counsel
whom he had specially requested. The co-accused entered
a plea of not guilty. The prosecution and the co-accused
proceeded to present their respective cases. When they had
rested, the accused, against his own counsel's advice, insisted
on taking the stand. He gave an account of his dealings
with his co-accused which amounted to a confession of the
larceny charge. However, the accused attempted to take
the blame for originating the idea of the theft and for
persuading the co-accused to join him in the undertaking.
His counsel thereupon moved to be relieved from further
participation in the case because he had "reason to believe
that [the accused had] perjured himself." He also added
that if he continued as defense counsel he would labor
"under certain mental difficulties" in presenting the case
for the accused on the sentence. These remarks were made
in the presence of the court members who, as indicated
earlier, pass on both the findings and the sentence. Counsel
was not relieved, and the accused was convicted and sen-
tenced. The case came before the Court of Military Appeals
on petition for review filed by the accused in which he
contended he was denied due process because his lawyer
was so lacking in diligence and professional competency
as to make his trial a sham. The Court held that the
accused's voluntary plea of guilty and sworn testimony
the sentence is single; it embraces all the offenses of which the accused is
convicted; and, as previously indicated in the text, unrelated offenses can be
and, in fact, are required to be brought to trial at the same time. Moreover,
intermediate appellate courts have power to reduce or modify the sentence.
As a result, in a case in which there is error affecting only some of several
charges against the accused, the findings of guilty affected by the error may
be set aside, along with the sentence, and a rehearing directed as to those
findings and the sentence. Consideration will be given during the sentence
proceedings to the previously affirmed findings of guilty. United States v.
Field, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 379, 18 C.M.R. 3 (1955) ; see also United States v. Oakley,
7 U.S.C.M.A. 733, 23 C.M.R. 197 (1957).
51 12 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 20 C.M.R. 74 (1961).
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showed there could be no possibility of prejudice because
of his counsel's alleged inadequacy in regard to the findings
of guilty. It reached a different conclusion as to the
sentence. Considering the remarks made by defense counsel
in open court, the Court held that his representation of
the accused during the sentence stage of the proceedings
had "the appearance of perfunctory formalism."
Professional competency raises the question of the ac-
cused's right to reject the counsel appointed for him. The
accused has no right to refuse appointed counsel because
counsel is newly admitted to the bar, and the accused thinks
he is not capable of representing him. 2  However, where
there is genuine difference of opinion affecting the merits
of the case, or where there is an honest clash of attitudes
and personalities between the accused and his appointed
counsel, which makes preparation of the defense case dif-
ficult, substitution of counsel is proper. 3
TH RIGHT TO A FAI HAXING
Even the most skilled and ingenious counsel is worth
little to an accused, if the trial is before a court that is
prejudiced against him. Due process demands a fair hear-
ing. A variety of circumstances may make the hearing
unfair. It is familiar learning, for example, that a biased
judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial. We may
argue over the source of our ideals of justice and fair
play but we are all convinced of the need for them in the
administration of the law.5 4
The standards of fairness that obtain in the federal
courts also obtain in courts-martial. In fact, the com-
prehensive revision of military law effected by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice plainly indicates that courts-
52 Spaulding v. United States, 279 F2d 65 (9th Cir. 1960).
53 United States v. Bell, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 306, 29 C.M.R. 122 (1960); see
also United States v. Howell, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 712, 29 C.M.R. 528 (1960).
5' Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court has said
that due process is rooted in our "American ideal of fairness." Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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martial are to be guided by the principles of law and
proceedings recognized in the federal courts.5 Starting with
its first case the Court of Military Appeals has looked
to the federal courts for precedent. But, it has not fol-
lowed the federal precedents without independent reap-
praisal of their validity. As Judge Brosman pointed out,
the Court is "freer than any in the land-save . . . the
Supreme Court- . . to seek, newfledged and sole, for
principle . . . unburdened by precedents demonstrated by
the test of time and experience to be unrealistic, ill-devised,
or out-moded. ' '56 Indeed, it has anticipated the Supreme
Court in some instances.57
While it can be said that military courts apply the
same criteria as the federal courts to determine the fairness
of the hearing accorded the accused, there is a difference
in emphasis and scope. Some of the differences merit par-
ticular attention.
An unbiased jury is, of course, a sine qua non for a
fair hearing. The requirement is basic in courts-martial,
but the requirement is more difficult to apply. Although
the function of the court members is substantially like that
of jurors in the civilian court, they do not act like jurors.58
Jurors in a civil trial seldom ask questions, and almost
never call for a witness not previously called by one of
the parties. The practice is different in the military. Court
members are authorized to participate in the trial. Article
46 of the Uniform Code provides that the court shall have
"equal opportunity" with the Government and the accused
to obtain witnesses. In practice, they call new witnesses
55 UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1958).
56 Brosman, The Court: Freer Than Most, 6 VAND. L. REv. 166, 167-68
(1953).
5 See Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); United States v.
DeLeon, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 747, 19 C.M.R. 43 (1955).
58 In some respects the powers of court members are much different from
jurors. A court member can overrule the law officer of a general court-
martial on a motion for a finding of not guilty, the equivalent of a directed
verdict. UCMJ art. 51(c), 10 U.S.C. §851(c) (1958) ; United States v. Gray,
6 U.S.C.M.A. 615, 20 C.M.R. 331 (1956): United States v. Berry, 1 U.S.C.M.A.
235, 2 C.M.R. 141 (1952). A number of proposals to deprive court members
of this right and to make them virtually like civilian jurors have been presented,
but no action has been taken by Congress to amend the Uniform Code.
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and they often question the witnesses called by the Govern-
ment and the defense.5 9 Such participation always raises
the question of bias and partisanship. Where does an
impartial interest in eliciting facts for a better informed
judgment on the accused's guilt or innocence leave off, and
an interest in proving the prosecution's case begin? That
is not an easy question to answer, especially since nuances
in voice and gesture are not readily apparent in the pages
of the record of trial. Judge Latimer recently noted that
when "court members decide to try their hands at the art
of cross-examination they usually select the witnesses favor-
able to the defense as their victims," and thereby become
subject to the charge of being "pseudo-prosecutors seeking
to salvage a case for the Government." 60 Even a single
question or remark may indicate bias."' Consequently, the
appellate tribunal reviewing the record of trial must be
particularly sensitive to the questions asked by the court
members in order to safeguard the accused's right to a fair
trial.62
Until recently, other conduct by court members also
had to be examined carefully for possible bias. Under the
provisions of paragraph 55 of the Manual for Courts-Martial
if the court members believe that the evidence presented
by the prosecution is either insufficient to convict or shows
the commission of an offense other than that charged, it
may suspend the trial and ask the convening authority
for further instructions. Several serious objections to the
propriety of this procedure are apparent. Among other
things, it appears to constitute "the court an advisory body
for the convening authority." 63 However, a majority of
the Court on first consideration of the procedure did not
5 9 United States v. Parker, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 182, 21 C.M.R. 308 (1956).6 0 United States v. Flagg, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 636, 640, 29 C.M.R. 452, 456
(1960).0 1 United States v. Lindsay, 12 U.S.C.M.A. -- 30 C.M.R. - (1961);
United States v. Stringer, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 122, 17 C.M.R. 122 (1954).
62 United States v. Marshall, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 117, 30 C.M.R. 117 (1961);
United States v. Blankenship, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 328, 22 C.M.R. 118 (1956).
63 United States v. Turkali, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 340, 346, 20 C.M.R. 56, 62,
(1955) (Quinn, CJ., concurring).
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consider it to be unfair to the accused. As a result, when-
ever there was a suspension of proceedings under the Manual
provision, it was necessary to scrutinize what transpired
to determine if the court members had aligned themselves
with the prosecution. Recent re-examination of the practice
in light of added experience with it resulted in its rejection.
In United States v. Johnpier 64 a question arose over whether
the evidence showed the accused had committed the offense
of suffering a prisoner to escape, the offense charged, or
the offense of releasing a prisoner without proper authority.
The proceedings were suspended under paragraph 55 to
obtain further direction from the convening authority. About
a month later, the court-martial was reconvened on direction
from the convening authority to continue the trial on the
offense charged. The law officer thereupon declared a
mistrial. One of the reasons he gave was that it was
apparent that there was a conflict of opinion between him
and the convening authority as to the nature of the offense
shown by the evidence; and he believed that his position
as the judge of the court was seriously compromised
by the convening authority's direction. The Court upheld
his ruling. It said:
Since one of the two reasons given by the law officer is plainly
sufficient to support his ruling, there would ordinarily be no need
to discuss the remaining reason. However, suspension of the pro-
ceedings under paragraph 55 of the Manual is too important a
matter to be passed over without comment. In United States v.
Turkali, 6 USCMA 340, 20 CMR 56, the concurring opinion
alluded to some of the dangers inherent in the procedure. It was
pointed out that the procedure is "one-sided" and, therefore, unfair,
in that it gives the Government a preliminary "advisory opinion"
on the court's attitude toward the evidence. This case confirms
the present-day inappropriateness of the procedure, and gives sub-
stance to the idea that it tends to make the law officer a "mere
figurehead" in the trial.
Appellate defense counsel contend that since the procedure of
suspension is sanctioned by the Manual and by the decision of the
64 12 U.S.C.M.A. 90, 30 C.M.R. 90 (1961).
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majority of this Court in the TurkaU case, there was no possible
justification for the law officer's conclusion that his authority was
undermined by the convening authority's direction to continue with
the trial. There are, however, "nuances" in the atmosphere of a
trial which cannot be fully depicted in the cold pages of the record
of trial. United States v. Gori, 282 F.2d 43 (CA 2d Cir.) (1960).
One of the nuances in this case indicates rather clearly that the
law officer was convinced the convening authority's direction seriously
compromised his position as the judge of the court, and gave rise
to substantial doubt whether the court-martial would remain un-
influenced by the apparent "victory" of the convening authority
on a point of law. Cf. United States v. Knudson, 4 USCMA 587,
16 CMR 161. The pages of the record confirm his feeling. Also,
the law officer was a member of the Field Judiciary Division,
and a stranger to the command which convened the court. It is
not at all fanciful to imagine that, as the situation developed, he
lost not only "face" but also control over the court. We have
no difficulty, therefore, in concluding that on this ground, too, the
declaration of a mistrial was justifiable. Moreover, we are con-
vinced that the paragraph 55 procedure for suspension of trial in
order to obtain the views of the convening authority is both archaic
and injudicious. It is contrary to the express language of Article
51, and violates the spirit of the Uniform Code and the purposes
for which it was enacted. Accordingly, the contrary view set out
in United States v. Turkali, supra, is overruled.65
One of the severest criticisms of the court-martial
process was that it was essentialy a tool of command; that
both the court-martial and the subordinate commander were
inordinately sensitive to a superior officer's desires and re-
sponded readily to his requests. Such pressure and in-
fluences on the court-martial and the subordinate com-
mander were described as "command control." 66
The Uniform Code sought to stamp out the pressure.
Article 37 provides in part that no person subject to
the Code "may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized
6 United States v. Johnpier, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 90, 94, 30 C.M.R. 90, 94(1961).
16 Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military ustwe,
6 VAND. L. R!v. 169 (1953).
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means, influence the action of a court-martial. . . ., 67 No
case has been before the Court of Military Appeals in which
a person has been charged with a violation of this article.
But, there are many cases in which the Court and service
boards of review found the presence of command control
which deprived the accused of a fair hearing.68
Command control may take many forms. Most obvious
is the conference before the start of trial in which the
commander's views about the accused or the offense are
brought directly home to the court members. 69  Subtle
psychological pressures, at all levels of the court-martial
process, are less direct, but just as effective. Some elements
of pressure which have been condemned by the Court of
Military Appeals are worth mentioning.
One of the most troublesome forms of indirect pressure
is the policy statement. A policy can be framed as a positive
order; or it may be phrased an indicating what is merely
desirable. As members of a hierarchical system, with pro-
motion and type of duty largely dependent upon the rating
of superiors, military personnel would naturally tend to
regard all policy as mandatory. In the discharge of their
executive and administrative responsibilities uncritical ac-
ceptance of policy is probably beneficial to both the service
and the individual. In a judicial proceeding such ready
tractability would violate the requirements of a fair hearing.
The court-martial process is judicial in nature.70
Article 37, which prohibits interference with, or improper
influence upon, the convening authority or the reviewing
authority speaks of their "judicial acts." The court-martial
tries and sentences a person 'for a criminal act. It has
6 U.C.M.J. art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1958).
"United States v. Hedges, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 642, 29 C.M.R. 458 (1960);
United States v. Coffield, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 77, 27 C.M.R. 151 (1958); United
States v, Sears, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 661, 20 C.M.R. 377 (1956); United States v.
Littrice, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 13 C.M.R. 43 (1953).
69 United States v. Littrice, supra note 68.
70 In making this statement, I have not overlooked the apparently contrary
opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957). He
described courts-martial as "simply executive tribunals whose personnel are in
the executive chain of command." Cf. Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S.
543 (1887).
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the power to imprison the accused and to impose fines
and forfeitures upon him. Under the so-called Hiss Act a
conviction by court-martial has the same effect as a con-
viction by a federal district court in denying the accused
pension and retirement benefits which he would otherwise
be entitled to receive from the federal government. 71  Mani-
festly, therefore, any external pressure or influence which
dictates conviction or sentence has no place in the courts-
martial process.
Policy is important at the very threshold of the court-
martial proceeding. Earlier it was observed that the final
decision to refer a charge for trial before a summary, special
or general court-martial is the responsibility of the officer
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the ac-
cused. A number of factors may be considered by him in
reaching his decision. One is the severity of the offense.
In theory, he can refer a minor offense, such as being dis-
orderly in quarters for which the maximum penalty is
forfeiture of two-thirds pay for one month and confine-
ment for one month, to a general court-martial, but he
is not likely to do S0.72
A second circumstance of substantial importance is
the policy of a superior commander or of the President
of the United States, as set out in the Manual for Courts-
Martial or other executive orders or directives. Consider-
ation, however, cannot be dictation. The policy statement
71 See United States v. Pajak, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 686, 29 C.M.R. 502 (1960).
72Strictly speaking no offense committed by a commissioned or non-
commissioned officer can be considered minor. A commissioned officer sentenced
to confinement is also usually dismissed. Any sentence to confinement or to
hard labor without confinement imposed upon a non-commissioned officer re-
sults in automatic reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. UCMJ art. 58(a),
10 U.S.C. § 858(a) (1958), added in July, 1960 to change the effect of the de-
cision in United States v. Simpson, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 229, 27 C.M.R. 303 (1959).
Also, a minor offense may have the consequences of a major delict if the
accused has previously been convicted by court-martial. Two previous con-
victions within one year authorize imposition of a bad conduct discharge;
and three previous convictions within that period authorize a dishonorable
discharge and confinement at hard labor for one year, without regard to
whether the offense of which the accused stands convicted carries that punish-
ment. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 127c, § B,
as amended by Exec. Order No. 10565, 19 Fed. Reg. 6299 (1954).
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cannot be made mandatory upon the court-martial author-
ity. Rather, it must leave him free to follow or to dis-
regard it, in the exercise of his judicial discretion."
Injection of policy in the trial proceeding may come
about in many ways. In most instances there is no
permissible basis for calling the attention of the court
members to the policy, and consequently reference to the
policy is manifestly unfair to the accused.74 Two ostensibly
valid means of bringing policy before the court were used
in the years immediately following enactment of the
Uniform Code.
One medium of entry was the doctrine of judicial
notice under which a copy of an official publication and
general order and circular is admissible in evidence. 75 The
other method was use of the Manual for Courts-Martial
as a trial guide and source of instruction. Both means of
entry are now closed.
After some preliminary warnings that the policy pro-
nouncements set out in the Manual exerted an unfair in-
fluence upon the court-martial, the Court of Military Ap-
peals held that the Manual could not be used in a court-
martial case in any way that appeared to deprive the
accused of a fair hearing. In the landmark opinion in
United States v. Rinehart76 the Court said:
One further matter merits discussion. In the recent case of
United States v. Boswell, 8 USCMA 145, 23 CMR 369, we voiced
our disapproval of the practice of permitting court members to consult
"outside sources" for information on the law. We there said that
"the Manual is no different from other legal authorities. It, too,
has no place in the closed session deliberations of the court-martial."
73United States v. Rinehart, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 24 C.M.R. 212 (1957);
United States v. Fowle, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 349, 22 C.M.R. 139 (1956); United
States v. Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 22 C.M.R. 83 (1956); United States
v. Isaacs, Docket No. 11,525, reversed on concession by the Government that
the accused's commanding officer's recommendation for trial by general court-
martial was dictated by a policy letter of the Secretary of the Navy.
74 United States v. Leggio, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 8, 30 C.M.R. 8 (1961); United
States v. Shepherd, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 90, 25 C.M.R. 352 (1958) (opinion by
Latimer, J.).7 5 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 147a.
768 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 24 C.M.R. 212 (1957).
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It was pointed out that court members may not understand the
Manual's passages thereby creating an atmosphere of confusion and
doubt during the closed deliberations. What was prophesied in
Boswell, supra, has now come to pass. The prosecution in dosing
argument had directed the court's attention to paragraphs 7 6a(5)
and 33h of the Manual. The court-martial in closed session, and
on its own initiative, "discovered" paragraphs 7 6a(3) and 7 6 a(4)
of the Manual, neither paragraph being material in arriving at an
appropriate sentence. Thus a virtual race to the Manual had begun
in spite of the fact that the law officer had fully and adequately
instructed the members on the applicable law pertaining to the
sentence.
We cannot sanction a practice which permits court members to
rummage through a treatise on military law, such as the Manual,
indiscriminately rejecting and applying a myriad of principles-
judicial and otherwise-contained therein. The consequences that
flow from such a situation are manifold. In the first place, many
of the passages contained therein have been either expressly or im-
pliedly invalidated by decisions of this Court. [Citing cases.]
Secondly, we have consistently emphasized the role of the law
officer in the instructional area. In United States v. Chaput,
2 USCMA 127, 7 CMR 3, we said that, "It is fundamental that
the only appropriate source of the law applicable to any case should
come from the law officer."
Thirdly, the great majority of court members are untrained in
the law. A treatise on the law in the hands of a non-lawyer creates
a situation which is fraught with potential harm, especially when
one's life and liberty hang in the balance. We have absolutely no
way of knowing whether a court-martial applied the law instructed
upon by the law officer or whether it rejected such instructions
in favor of other material contained in the Manual. In United
States v. Chaput, supra, we reversed a conviction where a law
officer had referred the court members to several board of review
decisions to permit them to determine for themselves the applicable
legal principles involved.
In civilian practice it would constitute a gross irregularity to
permit jurors to consult outside legal references.
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We see no compelling reason why a similar rule should not be
adopted in courts-martial practice. All the law a court-martial need
know in order to properly perform its functions must come from the
law officer and nowhere else.
We are fully aware that the change in the system of military
law occasioned by this decision represents a substantial departure
from prior service practices. However, we cannot but feel that
such change was imperatively needed if the system of military law
is to assume and maintain the high and respected place that it
deserves in the jurisprudence of our free society. Prior to the Code
courts-martial were neither instructed on the elements of the offense
charged nor the principles of law applicable to the case. The de-
liberations of the court were in camera and a genuine need then
existed for the use of the Manual by the court members in de-
termining the law to be applied. However, with the advent of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice many of the problems which
previously existed under the old system disappeared. Congress
created the role of law officer and fashioned him in the image of a
civilian judge. He was charged with the responsibility of instructing
the court on the elements of the offense and the applicable principles
of law in order that informed and intelligent findings and sentence
could be reached. In a word, he was made a fountainhead of the
law in the court-martial scheme of things. The sum total of these
and other remedial changes inaugurated by the Code was to bring
court-martial procedure, wherever possible, into conformity with
that prevailing in civilian criminal courts. We believe that military
law under the Code has come of age and the time has come when
the use of the Manual by the court-martial must end.
Congress gave the President the right to fix the maximum
punishment for offenses under the Uniform Code, but we do not
believe that Congress intended the President to sit with the court
members when they adjudge a sentence in a given case. As a matter
of fact, the President himself clearly did not expect to be brought
into every trial. He expressly provided that the rules of evidence
normally applicable to findings are also applicable to sentence, except
as they may be relaxed to a limited extent by the law officer or
the president of the special court. Paragraph 75c(1), Manual,
supra. See also United States v. Strand, 6 USCMA 297, 20 CMR
13.77
77 Id. at 406-08, 24 C.M.R. at 216-19.
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The influence of policy has also been carefully cir-
cumscribed in connection with the review of a conviction
by the convening authority. Article 61 of the Uniform
Code gives the convening authority nearly unlimited power
over the findings and sentence. If he so desires, the con-
vening authority can set aside the findings of guilty and
the sentence, and dismiss the charge, irrespective of the
sufficiency of the evidence of guilt and the appropriateness
of the sentence adjudged by the court-martial. In the
exercise of this discretion, he can consult anyone he pleases
for information about the accused, including as Judge
Brosman picturesquely put it "a guy named Joe." A policy
directive is, therefore, a matter that may properly be con-
sidered -by him. But, as in the case of reference of the
charges to trial, policy statements cannot dictate the result.
Consequently, if it appears that the convening authority be-
lieves he must act in any particular way because of his
own policy or the policy of his superior commander, his
action in the case will be set aside, and the record of trial
will be returned for reconsideration.78
Before acting on the sentence, the convening authority
usually obtains a great deal of information about the ac-
cused's military and civilian background and his character
that is not shown in the record of trial. The information
is generally obtained by his staff judge advocate or legal
officer, 79 and is set out in what is called the post-trial advice
or review. This advice consists of a comprehensive summary
and analysis of the legal issues raised by the record of trial,
and of recommendations to the convening authority on the
findings and the sentence.80 As regards the extra-record
information on the accused's background, the review is in
a general way, like the probation report to the sentencing
judge in a civilian criminal case. Since there is this re-
78United States v. Wise, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 472, 20 C.M.R. 188 (1955);
United States v. Doherty, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 287, 17 C.M.R. 287 (1954).
79 The terminology varies according to the service. In the Army and Air
Force, the legal advisor is called the staff judge advocate; in the Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard he is described as the legal officer.80 See United States v. Fields, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 70, 25 C.M.R. 332 (1958).
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semblance between the review and probation report, it
was originally thought that the accused had no right to
deny or rebut new adverse matter contained in it. 81 The
Court of Military Appeals, however, regarded the accused's
right to a fair hearing in broader terms. It held that the
accused is entitled to an opportunity to explain or deny
new unfavorable information included in the staff judge
advocate's post-trial advice. It spelled out the right in
United States v. Griffin.8 2 Shortly thereafter, in United
States v. Vara 83 it laid down general guidelines for changes
in the practice which would assure preservation of the right.
These cases show clearly the deep dimensions in military
law of the requirements of a fair hearing.
Failure or refusal to accord the accused the opportunity
to rebut or explain adverse new matter in the post-trial
advice is ground for setting aside the action taken by the
convening authority in reliance upon the advice. Not every
deprivation of the right, however, is ground for reversal.
If the adverse matter is of a minor nature, and it reasonably
appears that the convening authority was not influenced
by it, the error is not prejudicial and may be disregarded.84
Closely related to the right to an opportunity to rebut
new matter, is the accused's right to have the advice itself
prepared by an impartial person. Trial counsel 5 and the
law officer 86 have each a special interest in the outcome
of the prosecution, and are, therefore, ineligible to prepare
or to assist in the preparation of the post-trial advice.
Disqualification also exists if the person preparing or
assisting in the preparation of the advice previously acted
in a companion case in an inconsistent capacity. The
reason for the exclusion was stated by the Court of Military
Appeals in United States v. Hightower 87 as follows:
Realistically then, the accused and Moye were coaccused, tried
82 See Williams v. State of New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) ; Cf. Town-
send v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
82 8 U.S.C.M.A. 206, 24 C.M.R. 16 (1957).
83 8 U.S.C.M.A. 651, 25 C.M.R. 155 (1958).
84 United States v. Sarlouis, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 148, 25 C.M.R. 410 (1958).
85 United States v. Clisson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 277, 17 C.M.R. 277 (1954).
S6 United States v. Crunk, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 290, 15 C.M.R. 290 (1954).
87 5 U.S.C.M.A. 385, 18 C.M.R. 9 (1955).
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separately for the same offense. Moye was convicted. Captain
Hudson was the successful Trial Counsel. Having so acted, would
he acquire a "frame of reference" which would improperly influence
him in a review of the accused's case? See United States v. Stringer,
supra, page 503. The Government maintains that he would not.
It contends that one of the fundamental qualities of the legal pro-
fession is a highly refined capacity to exercise objectivity and
judicial discipline. We are quite willing to accord this quality
to most members of the profession, but we believe that an impartial
observer would conclude that personal convictions formed in the
prosecution of one accused would tend to influence the prosecutor in
his relations with the coaccused.
We have no doubt that Captain Hudson, having been instrumental
in convicting Moye, would be personally convinced of the accused's
guilt. Since the conviction is founded on personal experiences, it
would certainly be more deep-seated than an opinion formed only
on the basis of an official evaluation of the record. A fixed opinion
of this kind manifestly affects the impartiality of the review. One
consequence of it is to deny the accused the benefit of any doubt
regarding the correctness of rulings by the law officer. See United
States v. Floyd, 2 USCMA 183, 7 CMR 59. A second consequence
is the sentence phase of the review. There is a distinct risk that
the sentence recommendation would reflect unrecorded prejudices
formed during the reviewer's prosecution of the coaccused. See
United States v. Bound, 1 USCMA 224, 2 CMR 130. Thus, since
the charges are alike and there is a substantial basis for "overzealous
prosecution," we believe that the Moye case and the present pro-
ceeding constitute the "same case" within the meaning of Article
6(c).
Of course, in reaching our conclusion, we do not imply that Cap-
tain Hudson intentionally deprived the accused of an unbiased review.
On the contrary, we are sure that he was honest and sincere in
his belief that he could act dispassionately. Moreover, Congress
intended to remove all possibility of bias; it did not contemplate
ferreting for motives and delicate balancing of previous influences
against objective fairness. Cf. United States v. Deain, 5 USCMA 44,
17 CMR 44. We must insist on adherence to the Congressional
policy directed against conduct tending to impair the impartiality
of the post-trial review.
One final point urged by the Government requires consideration.
The Government contends that inasmuch as Captain Hudson pre-
pared the report as Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, he was, es-
sentially, only an amanuensis for the Staff judge Advocate. The
1961 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
latter had no previous connection with either case, and, consequently,
there is no violation of Article 6(c). This argument was adopted
by the board of review below. However, some months after
publication of the opinion by the board of review, this Court decided
United States v. Crunk, 4 USCMA 290, 15 CMR 290. In that
case, the person who had acted as law officer at the trial later pre-
pared the post-trial review, in conjunction with a civilian attorney.
There, as here, the staff judge advocate noted that he concurred
in the opinions and recommendations of the reviewers. In a
unanimous opinion, we held such conduct to be prohibited by Article
6(c).88
CONCLUSION
Military service is not an isolated and occasional oc-
currence in American life. The "cold war" has kept the
Armed Forces at record peacetime levels. Millions of
civilians work closely with, and for, the military establish-
ment. The points of contact between the civilian com-
munity and the Armed Forces are today so numerous and
so intimate that it can truly be said that military life is
an immediate and integral part of American life.
Part of our heritage of freedom is the complex of the
basic rights embraced within constitutional due process.
Those same rights are inseparably interwoven into due
process of military law. Other fundamental protections
against arbitrary and unjust action have been added by
Congress through the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
As the Supreme Court of the military justice system, the
United 'States Court of Military Appeals has the unique
responsibility to protect and preserve due process in courts-
martial. However, pronouncements by the highest court of
legal doctrine are sterile exercises in semantics, if there is
only grudging compliance with the letter, and little regard
for the spirit, of the law. It is, therefore, the responsibility
of the legal profession, both in and out of the military
service, to uphold the meaning and importance of due
process in the administration of military law, and to
help make military law an integral part of American
jurisprudence.
8 Id. at 388-89, 18 C.M.R. at 12-13.
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